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Legal Scholarship, Humility, and the Scientific
Method
David J. Herring
Abstract
This essay responds to the question of “What next for law and behavioral biol-
ogy?” by describing an approach to legal scholarship that relies on the scientific
method. There are two steps involved in this approach to legal scholarship. First,
the legal scholar must become familiar with an area of scientific research that is
relevant to the development of law and policy. (This essay uses behavioral biology
research as an example.) Second, the legal scholar must seek and form relation-
ships across disciplines, becoming an active member of a scientific research team
that conducts studies relevant to particular issues of law and policy.
This approach to legal scholarship does not conceive law as a science. It also
does not place the legal scholar in the role of a scientist or empiricist. Instead,
it places the legal scholar in a much more modest role – as a participating mem-
ber of a scientific research team. In this role, the legal scholar contributes to a
research endeavor that employs the scientific method to produce new knowledge
mostly in small, incremental steps. This scholar strives for nothing more than to
participate in the production of new knowledge and the effective communication
of that knowledge to other scholars, legal decisionmakers, and policymakers. It
is a role that requires humility and promises significant advances in knowledge
relevant to law and policy.
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LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, HUMILITY, AND THE SCIENTIFIC 
METHOD 
By David J. Herring* 
This essay describes a new approach to legal scholarship in 
responding to the question of “what next for law and behavioral 
biology?”1  In pursuing this approach, the legal scholar seeks to 
participate in the process of scientific inquiry.  He or she does not draw 
on scientific theory and research in order to prescribe particular laws and 
policies.  Instead, the legal scholar engages scientific theory in order to 
ask new questions and to work with scientific researchers in formulating 
and testing hypotheses that are relevant to law and policy. 
Behavioral biology is one area of scientific inquiry that can support 
this type of scholarly endeavor, albeit one that is well-suited to 
enhancing discussions of law and policy.  Owen Jones is a leading legal 
scholar in this area whose work provides a useful conceptual 
framework.2  He has explained the law of law’s leverage, delineating the 
contribution behavioral biology can make to a detailed discussion of the 
possible benefits and costs related to particular legal rules and regimes.3  
(It is important to note that he has done this without advocating for any 
particular legal result or regulatory scheme.)  Jones has also explained 
 
*
 Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law.  For their invaluable insights, 
comments and points of disagreement, I would like to thank Randy Alison Aussenberg, 
Naomi Cahn, June Carbone, Richard Delgado, Michele Kristakis, John Lanou, Debra 
Lieberman, Michael Madison, Margaret Mahoney, Peter Oh, Justin Park, Thomas Ross, 
Jeffrey Shook, Jean Stefancic, Mark Strauss, George Taylor, Lu-in Wang, Valerie Weis, and 
Michael Weisberg. 
 1. This question raised one of the central issues addressed at an academic roundtable 
organized by Owen Jones, Professor of Law and Professor of Biological Sciences at 
Vanderbilt University, and attended by a group of leading legal scholars in April, 2006. 
 2. See, e.g., Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law:  An Introduction and 
Application to Child Abuse, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1117 (1997) [hereinafter Jones, Evolutionary 
Analysis in Law]; Owen D. Jones, Time-Shifted Rationality and the Law of Law’s Leverage:  
Behavioral Economics Meets Behavioral Biology, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1141 (2001) [hereinafter 
Jones, Law’s Leverage]; Owen D. Jones, Proprioception, Non-Law, and Biolegal History, 53 
FLA. L. REV. 831 (2001) [hereinafter Jones, Biolegal History]; Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. 
Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral Biology, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 405 (2005). 
 3. See Jones, Law’s Leverage, supra note 2. 
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the concept of time shifted rationality – a concept that may provide a 
useful theoretical component for behavioral economics.4  In addition, he 
has explained how consideration of behavioral biology can help identify 
likely areas for legal regulation across societies.5  In this last endeavor, 
Jones has made significant progress in developing a general theory of 
law, identifying which areas of human activity are likely to generate 
laws and gain the attention of lawmakers.6 
More germane to this essay, Jones’ work demonstrates the 
usefulness of specific findings from behavioral biology research to 
discussions of law and policy.  For example, he has used research that 
identifies the dramatically higher risk of maltreatment faced by children 
in stepfamilies.7  Drawing from the concepts of inclusive fitness and 
parental investment, behavioral biologists Martin Daly and Margo 
Wilson hypothesized that children living with biologically unrelated 
adults would suffer a higher rate of maltreatment.8  Their examination of 
data on child deaths from several societies provided support for their 
hypothesis.9  Jones has used this research to question child protection 
policies that largely disregard stepfamily relationships in assessing the 
risk of child maltreatment and in determining the appropriate level of 
family support services.10  Child welfare policymakers may want to 
avoid stigmatizing stepfamily relationships by disregarding these 
relationships.  However, Jones’ work reveals a significant cost related to 
this policy goal and approach – an increased risk of child maltreatment.11 
Similarly, Jones has used behavioral biology research that 
 
 4. Id. 
 5. See Jones, Biolegal History, supra note 2. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law, supra note 2.  The stepfamily research 
used by Jones focuses on incidents of infanticide rather than on maltreatment generally.  But it 
is important to note that the behavioral biology researchers in this area only used the 
occurrence of child death to test their broader hypothesis concerning a higher risk of 
maltreatment within stepfamilies because there is relatively good, detailed data on child 
deaths in comparison to that available on child maltreatment in general.  See MARTIN DALY & 
MARGO WILSON, HOMICIDE (1988) (In other words, child death served as a proxy for or 
indicator of child maltreatment generally.).  Because child maltreatment, as opposed to child 
death, is a pervasive problem, identifying and addressing a higher risk of child maltreatment 
adds a significant component to discussions of child welfare law and policy as they relate to 
stepfamilies.  Jones’ work explores this powerful finding in a way that should generate further 
discussion and research.  Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law, supra note 2. 
 8. See MARTIN DALY & MARGO WILSON, HOMICIDE, at 83-91 (1988). 
 9. Id. 
 10. See Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law, supra note 2. 
 11. Id.;  see Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 435-36. 
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addresses rape.12  The research supports a hypothesis that males 
sometimes employ rape as a sexual strategy, and thus, that a rapist may 
not be motivated solely by animus and violent tendencies toward 
women.13  More specifically, the researchers found that victims of rape 
are most often of reproductive age, with rape being relatively less 
prevalent for prepubescent girls and post-menopausal women.14  Also, 
rape is more likely to involve penile-vaginal intercourse, as opposed to 
other forms of sexual interaction, when the victim is within her 
reproductive years.15  In addition, rape victims in some studies appear to 
experience more severe trauma if they are within their reproductive 
years.16  As Jones explains, these findings may be relevant to discussions 
of how to prevent and punish rape.17 
Noting the work of Jones and others in this area, Professor John 
Monahan asserts that behavioral biology has the heuristic power to raise 
interesting questions related to the law.18  For example, behavioral 
biologists have drawn on concepts and theories in their field to pose the 
question of whether infants are disproportionately killed by 
stepparents.19  The research generated by this question is relevant to 
discussions of child protection practices, policies and laws. 
Professor Monahan also notes that behavioral biology has 
substantial breadth in that it possesses a set of core concepts that one can 
employ to answer the interesting questions that it raises.20  Concepts 
such as inclusive fitness, kin altruism, discriminatory parental solicitude, 
and reciprocal altruism hold broad explanatory power.  For example, 
these concepts provide guidance for thoughtful research that addresses 
stepparent/stepchild relationships. 
 
 12. See Owen D. Jones, Sex, Culture, and the Biology of Rape:  Toward Explanation 
and Prevention, 87 CAL. L. REV. 827 (1999). 
 13. Id. at 853-72. 
 14. Id. at 866. 
 15. Id. at 868. 
 16. See Jones, supra note 12, at 868-69. 
 17. Id. at 909-33.  Beyond his own theoretical and applied scholarship in this area, 
Jones has actively fostered other legal scholars’ use of behavioral biology research.  He is a 
frequent participant in programs at the Gruter Institute and he founded the Society for 
Evolutionary Analysis in Law (“SEAL”).  He has organized conferences that provide for 
important and rich interactions among legal scholars, biologists and researchers from other 
disciplines.  Jones has also been available to read numerous draft papers, providing invaluable 
comments and guidance.  I and others have benefitted immensely from his contributions to 
our projects. 
 18. See John Monahan, Could “Law and Evolution” Be the Next “Law and 
Economics”?, 8 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 123, 124 (2000). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 124-25. 
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Finally, Professor Monahan discusses behavioral biology’s depth.21  
Namely, he asks whether behavioral biology can answer legal questions 
in the kind of specific detail necessary to guide both legal scholarship 
and the law in action.22  In addressing this question, he recognizes the 
high degree of specificity of modern evolutionary explanations.23  He 
then points to the work of Daly and Wilson as a powerful example of 
how behavioral biology theory can generate specific predictions that 
subsequent empirical research confirms.24  Professor Monahan 
concludes that the explanations of particular aspects of human behavior 
arising from behavioral biology provide legal scholars with powerful 
and useful insights. 
In reaching his conclusion, Professor Monahan speculates that 
behavioral biology’s impact on legal scholarship could be similar to that 
of economics.25  In his view, economics has served as the “lodestone” 
for a substantial portion of recent legal scholarship.26  Because of its 
heuristic power, breadth, and depth, Professor Monahan asserts that 
behavioral biology could be another lodestone for legal scholarship.27 
While I agree with Professor Monahan’s basic conclusion, I do not 
embrace his speculation because I envision using behavioral biology 
research in a way that departs from my perception of how legal scholars 
use economic concepts.  Namely, my proposed approach does not offer 
new theoretical paradigms or attempt to guide and assess broad 
approaches to law and policy.  Instead, I seek to use behavioral biology 
research simply to raise questions and formulate hypotheses that 
enhance discussions of particular laws and policies.  This is an approach 
that is much smaller in scope than the law and economics project.  
However, I believe that, if developed carefully and rigorously, this 
approach could eventually have a significant impact on legal 
scholarship.  It has the potential to be both deep (yielding small, focused 
pieces) and broad (powerful and transformative when viewed as a 
whole).  In the end, this approach has the potential to transform the legal 
 
 21. Id. at 125. 
 22. See Monahan, supra note 18, at 125. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id.; Martin Daly & Margo Wilson, Evolutionary Psychology and Marital Conflict:  
The Role of Stepchildren, in SEX, POWER, CONFLICT:  EVOLUTIONARY AND FEMINIST 
PERSPECTIVES 9, 16-18 (David Buss & Neil Malamuth eds., 1996); Martin Daly & Margo 
Wilson, Crime and Conflict:  Homicide in Evolutionary Psychological Perspective, in CRIME 
AND JUSTICE:  A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 66-69 (Michael Tonry ed., 1997). 
 25. See Monahan, supra note 18, at 126. 
 26. Id. at 123. 
 27. Id. at 126-28. 
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scholar from a mere consumer of scientific findings into a participant in 
the production of new knowledge. 
The scientific method lies at the core of this approach to legal 
scholarship.  This method is a process of inquiry used by researchers in 
the basic sciences and other fields.28  Researchers initiate the process by 
developing a theory that recognizes and builds on others’ work in the 
area of inquiry.29  In this way, the scientific method is highly 
collaborative in nature, often generating long lines of inquiry that 
involve numerous researchers over a considerable period.30 
Closely related to the development of theory is the formulation of 
specific hypotheses that researchers can test in order to support the 
theory.  If the theory is correct, certain conditions should exist and 
certain consequences should follow.  Researchers can formulate research 
questions and methodologies to determine if, and to what degree, the 
predicted conditions and consequences actually exist and result.31 
Once researchers complete a test of a particular hypothesis, they 
can consider additional tests of the hypothesis.  If the test results either 
fail to fully verify the hypothesis or introduce new and unexpected 
elements, researchers can revise the hypothesis.  The revised hypothesis 
will generate additional research questions and tests.  If the research 
findings call the hypothesis into question in a fundamental way, 
researchers may conclude that the hypothesis is false.  Such a conclusion 
may also call into question the overarching theory that generated the 
hypothesis.  As a result, researchers might abandon the theory by 
formulating a new theory and paradigm in the area of inquiry.32 
This process of knowledge development has several important 
characteristics.  First, it is collaborative.  Groups of researchers often 
work in teams to design and conduct experiments.33  More important, the 
process of questioning the results of experiments and conducting further 
experiments engages researchers in a collective endeavor.  Although 
they may not be on the same research team, researchers pursuing a 
 
 28. See Thomas S. Ulen, The Unexpected Guest:  Law and Economics, Law and Other 
Cognate Disciplines, and the Future of Legal Scholarship, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 403, 406-09 
(2004) (criticizing the law and social science movement for lacking a theoretical framework). 
 29. Id. at 408. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 406-09. 
 32. See Ulen, supra note 28, at 406-09; THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF 
SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (3d ed. 1996). 
 33. This is apparent from an examination of scientific journals, with the majority of 
articles listing several co-authors who have worked together as a research team.  See, e.g., 
issues of the journal Evolution and Human Behavior. 
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specific line of inquiry respond to and build on the work of others.34  It is 
an on-going collective process that constantly produces additional 
hypotheses, experiments, and knowledge.35 
Second, this process is incremental.36  It proceeds with small, 
careful steps.  Each step or inquiry is focused, narrow, and small in 
scope.  These small steps constitute the heavy lifting of the scientific 
method – work that does not commonly result in the discovery of 
comprehensive knowledge or the expression of grand theory.  Taking 
these steps involves detailed work in the trenches of discovery and 
knowledge production.  It is work that is humble in nature, placing the 
scholar within a collective and cumulative effort to discover the finest 
details of how the world works.37 
Third, this process is only useful in discovering and understanding 
what is.  It does not contribute to the conception of what ought to be.38  
Researchers using this method are engaged in discovering detailed 
aspects of how the natural world operates.  Discoveries about what is 
may be useful to individuals, groups, and societies who have previously 
formulated, through a separate and independent process of inquiry and 
analysis, what ought to be.  But determining what ought to be is not the 
project of scientific scholars.39  Their project is much more focused and 
modest. 
This third characteristic of the scientific method raises the question 
of whether it can contribute anything to legal scholarship.  Arguably, the 
law is almost exclusively about what a society determines ought to be.  
The law reflects, and at times constructs, social values.  It does not 
simply accept what is.  Therefore, one can strongly question the value of 
a process utilized only to discover what is.  Such a process may be 
largely irrelevant to the social project of constructing, analyzing, and 
understanding law and legal regimes.40 
However, I believe that this process of scientific inquiry provides 
legal scholars with an opportunity to pursue projects that depart from 
 
 34. See Ulen, supra note 28, at 408. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law, supra note 2, at 1163; Jones, supra note 
12, at 893-95. 
 39. Id. 
 40. My colleague, Professor Thomas Ross, has pressed this point with me in discussions 
of my work, pointing me to Arthur Allen Leff, Law and, 87 YALE L.J. 989 (1978) and GRANT 
GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1977), among others.  See also Ulen, supra note 
28, at 419-20. 
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those intended to examine and explicate what ought to be.  Furthermore, 
I believe that these projects will not be irrelevant.  Rather, they will 
contribute to our understanding of law, and even to the construction of 
law. 
In describing this approach to legal scholarship that arises from the 
scientific method, it is useful to understand what this approach is not.  It 
is not traditional doctrinal analysis.  Arguably, doctrinal scholarship 
shares many of the characteristics of the scientific method.  It is 
collaborative.  The explication of legal doctrine involves numerous 
individuals who examine, analyze, and explain legislative and judicial 
decisions.  Although these individuals may not often work in research 
teams, they do engage in dialogue and interchange.  In addition, because 
doctrinal scholarship depends on the decisions of courts and legislatures, 
it is necessarily incremental.  Finally, a significant portion of doctrinal 
scholarship is largely descriptive, and thus often entails an explication of 
what is rather than what ought to be.41 
But doctrinal scholarship engages the legal scholar in a process of 
creation.  The doctrinal scholar does not simply discover an aspect of the 
natural world.  This scholar observes, organizes, and analyzes the law, 
and through this process, even if it is purportedly only descriptive in 
nature, participates in the human effort to construct the law and a 
particular society.42  She is not engaged only in the incremental 
discovery of what is.  Rather, she is engaged in the incremental analysis 
of what is, and often the construction of what ought to be.  By observing, 
explaining, analyzing and critiquing legal doctrine, the doctrinal scholar 
often attempts to channel, if not direct, the development of the law.43  
The doctrinal scholar’s participation in the process of constructing what 
is being studied (the law) differs markedly from the scientific scholar’s 
process of discovery.  Consequently, the legal scholar dedicated to the 
scientific method engages in scholarly projects that differ in nature from 
those of the doctrinal scholar. 
One can use this same distinction in addressing legal theory 
scholarship.  The legal theorist frequently, if not always, strives to 
participate in the construction of legal regimes.  Large theory pieces 
 
 41. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 83-91 (1995); NICHOLAS 
MERCURO & STEPHEN G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW:  FROM POSNER TO 
POSTMODERNISM AND BEYOND 10-12 (2d ed. forthcoming) (manuscript at 10-12, first 
chapter available on SSRN); cf. Ulen, supra note 28, at 411. 
 42. See id.; POSNER, supra note 41; Carl E. Schneider & Lee E. Teitelbaum, Life’s 
Golden Tree:  Empirical Scholarship and American Law, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 53, 60-61. 
 43. See Ulen, supra note 28, at 411; Richard A. Posner, Legal Scholarship Today, 115 
HARV. L. REV. 1314, 1314-16 (2002). 
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often prescribe the perception and development of law and society.  The 
theorist typically engages not only in the discovery of what is.  She also 
explores what ought to be.44  The theorist often engages in ambitious 
scholarly projects that extend well beyond the characteristic limits of the 
scientific method. 
In a recent article, Professor Thomas Ulen discusses the potential 
for the scientific method in legal scholarship.45  He describes how law 
and economics scholarship provides a robust example of the use of the 
scientific method and asserts that, while use of this method is not the 
only valid approach to legal scholarship, this approach holds the most 
promise for securing the larger academic community’s recognition of 
legal scholarship as a fully legitimate intellectual endeavor.46  Legal 
scholars’ use of the scientific method allows them to pursue projects that 
resemble those of other disciplines within the academic community.  To 
a degree unmatched by doctrinal scholarship and different types of legal 
theory scholarship such as legal realism and critical legal studies, the 
scientific approach provides a foundation for the development of 
universal, overarching theories and the testing of hypotheses generated 
by those theories.47 
Ulen encourages legal scholars to embrace the scientific method to 
test universal theories, such as economics’ rational choice theory, in the 
context of legal systems.48  Accordingly, he urges legal scholars to 
construct and participate in a creative, collective, widely collaborative, 
and cumulative process of inquiry and to engage fully in empirical 
research.49 
Professor Ulen’s vision for the study of law as science is extremely 
ambitious.  It entails an almost complete abandonment of traditional 
approaches to legal scholarship, seeking to engage many, if not all, legal 
scholars in a new scholarly endeavor. 
The approach to legal scholarship described in this essay fits within 
Ulen’s vision, but is less comprehensive.  It is an approach that some 
legal scholars (although certainly not all or even a majority50) may be 
 
 44. See POSNER, supra note 41, at 96-102; Schneider & Teitelbaum, supra note 42, at 
61. 
 45. See Ulen, supra note 28. 
 46. Id. at 428-29. 
 47. See Ulen, supra note 28. 
 48. Id. at 424-25. 
 49. Id. at 429; see also Schneider & Teitelbaum, supra note 42. 
 50. The point of this essay is not that the scientific method provides the only legitimate 
approach to legal scholarship.  There are certainly other valid approaches to discovering 
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interested in pursuing, not with the idea that it will transform the 
scholarly endeavor throughout the discipline or that it will grant them 
full status in the larger academic community, but with the modest goal 
of participation in the discovery of new knowledge that may be relevant 
to law and policy. 
There are two steps involved in this approach to legal scholarship.  
First, the legal scholar must become familiar with an area of scientific 
research that is relevant to the development of law and policy.  
Behavioral biology is an especially rich area of scientific research in this 
regard.  The research in this field provides useful information 
concerning many aspects of human behavior – the primary subject of 
law and policy.51  Of course, the legal scholar must become familiar not 
only with the general concepts and theories in the particular scientific 
field, but also with detailed findings from various research projects in 
the specific areas of interest to the legal scholar.  Accordingly, the legal 
scholar must develop the habit of reading relevant scientific journals.  
For example, the journal Evolution and Human Behavior is a good 
source of behavioral biology research that may be relevant to particular 
areas of law and policy. 
The second step requires the legal scholar to actively seek and form 
working relationships across disciplines.  She would seek out researchers 
who conduct studies relevant to particular issues of law and policy and 
engage them in discussions of their work.  Through these discussions, 
the legal scholar may have an opportunity to contribute to the scientific 
research endeavor, possibly influencing the questions that scientific 
researchers raise and address, increasing the likelihood that they will 
formulate and test hypotheses that provide useful knowledge for those 
working with the law. 
Ultimately, the legal scholar would become a member of the 
scientific research team.  Realization of this goal calls for an individual 
who is comfortable with a modest role in the production of scholarship.  
Such a legal scholar would be one member of a research team that would 
often include several researchers who have much more knowledge of the 
particular field of inquiry and of the scientific method.  The legal scholar 
would not likely lead the research team.  She would contribute to the 
 
knowledge and to legal scholarship.  This essay does not intend to preclude or discount these 
other approaches, but only to articulate a possible new approach. 
 51. See Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 407.  That is not to say that the information 
provided by behavioral biology research is not contested or controversial.  However, even 
many critics acknowledge the potential for useful behavioral biology research.  See DAVID J. 
BULLER, ADAPTING MINDS:  EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND THE PERSISTENT QUEST 
FOR HUMAN NATURE (2005). 
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team’s formulation of its research agenda, but not drive it.  She would 
hope to have the team test hypotheses that relate to law and policy.  She 
would then translate and communicate the knowledge produced by the 
research team to the legal and public policy communities, describing its 
possible relevance to particular legal and policy issues. 
Some of my current work provides an example of the first step in 
this approach to legal scholarship.  By attending academic conferences 
sponsored by the Gruter Institute, I became aware of the field of 
behavioral biology and its potential to contribute to legal scholarship.52  
Speakers at the conference came from many disciplines, including 
biology, economics, cognitive psychology, anthropology, law, and 
medicine.  They provided an excellent introduction to the field and a 
sense of the intellectual energy surrounding behavioral biology research. 
The conferences piqued my interest and inspired me to read 
numerous books and articles describing evolutionary theory.53  As I read 
this material, I became increasingly aware of its relevance to my work in 
child welfare law and policy.  The concepts of inclusive fitness, kinship 
altruism, parental investment, parent-offspring conflict, and paternity 
uncertainty appeared especially germane.54 
This literature directed me to research conducted to test numerous 
hypotheses based on evolutionary concepts.55  The articles reporting and 
discussing the results of scientific research differ dramatically from the 
typical law review article.  These articles appear much smaller in scope 
and ambition.  Rather than attempt to analyze an entire area or issue, 
reach a resolution, and provide suggestions for action, these articles 
often address only the findings drawn from a very narrow, focused 
experiment.56  These findings usually constitute a small step in the 
 
 52. Gruter Institute, www.gruterinstitute.org (last visited May 18, 2007). 
 53. See, e.g., ROBERT TRIVERS, SOCIAL EVOLUTION (1985); MARTIN DALY & MARGO 
WILSON, SEX, EVOLUTION, AND BEHAVIOR (2d ed. 1983); MATT RIDLEY, THE RED QUEEN:  
SEX AND THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1993); TIMOTHY H. GOLDSMITH & 
WILLIAM F. ZIMMERMAN, BIOLOGY, EVOLUTION, AND HUMAN NATURE (2001). 
 54. See TRIVERS, supra note 53. 
 55. See, e.g., articles in Evolution and Human Behavior, Journal of Personal and Social 
Psychology, and Evolutionary Social Psychology. 
 56. The line of articles discussing the ratio of the lengths of the second to fourth manual 
digits as a predictor of the degree of sexually dimorphic traits and behaviors provide examples 
of these narrow, focused experiments.  See, e.g., J. Coolican & Michael Peters, Sexual 
Dimorphism in the 2D/4D Ratio and Its Relation to Mental Rotation Performance, 24 
EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 179 (2003); J.T. Manning, P.E. Bundred & F.M. Mather, 
Second to Fourth Digit Ratio, Sexual Selection, and Skin Colour, 25 EVOLUTION & HUM. 
BEHAV. 38 (2004); Bernhard Fink, John T. Manning, Nick Neave & Karl Grammer, Second to 
Fourth Digit Ratio and Facial Asymmetry, 25 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 125 (2004); 
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development of knowledge related to a specific hypothesis. 
But this appearance of smallness belies a larger, more ambitious 
endeavor.  Read together, research articles addressing a particular 
hypothesis often reveal a substantial accretion of detailed knowledge.57  
They give rise to the sense of a collective research project that contrasts 
sharply with the individualistic nature of many projects published in law 
reviews. 
This contrast eventually led me to question the standard approach to 
legal scholarship.  But more immediately, the research articles led me to 
particular hypotheses and experiments that are relevant to child welfare 
law and policy.  For example, the concepts of inclusive fitness and 
kinship altruism generate a set of hypotheses that are particularly 
relevant.  One such hypothesis is that individuals favor other individuals 
whom they perceive as being biologically related to them, with the 
extent of favorable treatment varying in conjunction with the degree of 
biological relatedness (e.g. in general, a parent will provide more 
favorable treatment to his child than to his nephew; a brother will 
provide more favorable treatment to his full sister than to his half 
sister).58  A series of research studies, some involving animals and some 
involving humans, provide substantial support for this hypothesis.59 
A related hypothesis addresses the ability of individuals to 
recognize others who are biologically related to them.  In order for 
individuals to treat others more favorably based on the degree of 
biological relatedness, they would likely have to possess fairly 
sophisticated mechanisms for recognizing kin.  The concept of kinship 
 
Pamela S. Scarbrough & Victor S. Johnston, Individual Differences in Women’s Facial 
Preferences as a Function of Digit Ratio and Mental Rotation Ability, 26 EVOLUTION & HUM. 
BEHAV. 509 (2005). 
 57. For an article that describes, tests, and questions the significant accretion of 
knowledge surrounding the ratio of the lengths of the second to fourth manual digits as a 
predictor of the degree of sexually dimorphic traits and behaviors as referenced supra note 56, 
see David A. Putz, Steven J.C. Gaulin, Robert J. Sporter & Donald H. McBurney, Sex 
Hormones and Finger Length:  What Does 2D:4D Indicate?, 25 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 
182 (2004). 
 58. See TRIVERS, supra note 53, at 109-44; BULLER, supra note 51, at 351-55. 
 59. See DAVID J.C. FLETCHER & CHARLES D. MICHINER, KIN RECOGNITION IN 
ANIMALS (1987); Paul W. Sherman, Nepotism and the Evolution of Alarm Calls, 197 SCI. 
1246 (1977); Eugene Burnstein, Christian Crandall & Shinobu Kitayama, Some Neo-
Darwinian Decision Rules for Altruism:  Weighing Cues for Inclusive Fitness as a Function of 
the Biological Importance of the Decision, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 773 (1994); 
MARTIN DALY, CATHERINE SALMON & MARGO WILSON, KINSHIP:  THE CONCEPTUAL HOLE 
IN PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF SOCIAL COGNITION AND CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS IN 
EVOLUTIONARY SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 265 (Jeffrey A. Simpson & Douglas T. Kenrick eds., 
1997); Daniel J. Kruger, Evolution and Altruism:  Combining Psychological Mediators with 
Naturally Selected Tendencies, 24 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 118 (2003). 
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cues constitutes one possibility for such mechanisms.  Namely, 
behavioral biologists hypothesize that particular sensory cues give rise to 
finely tuned perceptions of kinship.60 
One such cue is facial resemblance.  Researchers have theorized 
that facial resemblance evokes prosocial behavior because it serves as a 
kinship cue.61  (This theory derived from the concept of kinship altruism, 
with prior research indicating that individuals provide more benefits to 
kin than to non-kin.62)  Researchers have also theorized that facial 
resemblance evokes stronger prosocial behavior from men than from 
women.63  (This theory derived from the concept of paternity uncertainty 
and the increased likelihood that a child who possesses similar facial 
features is a man’s biological child.  Because a woman does not confront 
the same uncertainty related to her biological child, facial similarity 
should have a less powerful effect.64) 
Drawing on these theories, a team of researchers hypothesized that 
an adult subject would respond favorably to a photo of a child who 
shares the adult’s facial features.65  (For example, the adult is likely to be 
comfortable spending the most time with the child who shares his facial 
features.  The adult is also likely to want to provide more financial 
support to such a child.  In addition, the adult is likely to discipline this 
child less severely than children whose facial features do not resemble 
his own.)  In addition, the researchers hypothesized that the favorable 
response would be stronger for male subjects than for female subjects.66 
In order to test the hypotheses, the researchers morphed a photo of 
a child with a photo of the adult subject, thus creating a child photo that 
resembled the adult.67  The adult subject then observed an array of child 
photos, one of which was the adult subject’s self morph, and responded 
 
 60. See Justin H. Park & Mark Schaller, Does Attitude Similarity Serve as a Heuristic 
Cue for Kinship?  Evidence of an Implicit Cognitive Association, 26 EVOLUTION & HUM. 
BEHAV. 158, 159-60 (2004). 
 61. See Steven M. Platek et al., Reactions to Children’s Faces:  Resemblance Affects 
Males More than Females, 23 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 159 (2002); Lisa M. De Bruine, 
Resemblance to Self-Increases the Appeal of Child Faces to Both Men and Women, 25 
EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 142 (2004). 
 62. See TRIVERS, supra note 53, at 143; DALY, SALMON & WILSON, supra note 59; 
Park & Schaller, supra note 60, at 159. 
 63. See Platek et al., supra note 61; Steven M. Platek et al., Reactions to Children’s 
Faces:  Males Are More Affected By Resemblance Than Females Are, and So Are Their 
Brains, 25 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 394 (2004).  But see De Bruine, supra note 61. 
 64. See Platek et al., supra note 63, at 395; De Bruine, supra note 61, at 143. 
 65. See Platek et al., supra note 61. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 161. 
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to a series of questions about how he or she would treat the children.68  
The experiment confirmed both of the hypotheses.69 
After the research team published the results of their experiment, an 
independent researcher questioned the study’s methodology.70  She 
designed and conducted a study that used enhanced technology and 
procedures for morphing photos.71  This researcher’s findings supported 
the hypothesis that adult individuals favor children who resemble 
them.72  However, her findings did not support the hypothesis that facial 
resemblance evokes a stronger favorable response from men than from 
women.73 
The original research team responded to this second set of findings 
by conducting an additional experiment.74  They improved their 
morphing technique, borrowing many of the methods used by the 
independent researcher.75  The third experiment yielded findings that 
provide support for both hypotheses.76(It is interesting to note that 
members of this research team had conducted an earlier experiment that 
allowed them to suggest that the favorable treatment effects of facial 
resemblance become insignificant at a point where the resemblance in 
facial appearance is less than 25%.77  This degree of resemblance 
corresponds to the degree of relatedness between grandparents and 
grandchildren.78  Based on these findings, the researchers speculated that 
once a kinship relationship is more distant than grandparent/grandchild, 
facial resemblance is unlikely to evoke a significant degree of 
differential favorable treatment.79) 
Although this line of research is not complete,80 it provides 
opportunities to apply new knowledge to the development of law and 
 
 68. Id. at 161-62. 
 69. See Platek et al., supra note 61, at 162-64. 
 70. See De Bruine, supra note 61. 
 71. Id. at 147. 
 72. Id. at 150. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See Platek et al., supra note 63. 
 75. Id. at 396-97. 
 76. Id. at 402-03. 
 77. See Steven M. Platek et al., How Much Paternal Resemblance Is Enough?  Sex 
Differences in Hypothetical Investment Decisions But Not In the Detection of Resemblance, 
24 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 81 (2002). 
 78. Id. at 86-87. 
 79. Id. 
 80. This line of research provides a good example of the process of inquiry pursuant to 
the scientific method.  The third experiment is unlikely to be the last word in this line of 
investigation.  Researchers are likely to develop further experiments to test and refine the two 
hypotheses related to facial resemblance as a kinship cue. 
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policy.  For example, the researchers’ findings may be relevant to foster 
care placement policies.  The public has established several normative 
goals for foster care placements – one of which is that public actors 
should work to ensure child safety.81  The research indicates that public 
child welfare agencies and juvenile courts may be able to secure safer 
foster care placements by matching a child’s facial features with those of 
her foster parent.82  As a result of such a matching process, the foster 
parent may be more likely to perceive the foster child as kin and provide 
relatively favorable treatment.  Because the incidence of maltreatment of 
children by foster parents is significantly higher than that for children in 
the general population,83 attempting to evoke favorable treatment 
through face matching may provide significant benefits in terms of child 
safety.84 
This is an example of applied behavioral biology that embraces the 
scientific method and generates a testable hypothesis.  Namely, a 
research team could propose that a public agency implement a facial 
resemblance policy, collect data concerning child safety in this 
experimental jurisdiction, and compare it to foster child safety data from 
a control jurisdiction.  If the rate of maltreatment is lower in the 
experimental jurisdiction than in the control jurisdiction, such a study 
may support the hypothesis that facial resemblance evokes favorable 
treatment that provides benefits in terms of securing foster child safety. 
Recently, I have expanded on my work in this area by examining 
additional research on kinship cues.  The research related to the kinship 
cue of proximity during the first three to six years of age has 
implications for foster care placement policy and the prevention of 
sibling incest.85  And the research related to the kinship cue of attitude 
similarity has implications for foster care placement policy that are 
similar to those of facial resemblance.86 
All my work in this area during the past three years constitutes only 
the first step in my proposed approach to legal scholarship – acquiring a 
 
 81. See Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 
(1997); 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(A) (1994); David J. Herring, Foster Care Safety and the 
Kinship Cue of Attitude Similarity, 7 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 355, 359-60 (2006). 
 82. See David J. Herring, Child Placement Decisions:  The Relevance of Facial 
Resemblance and Biological Relationships, 43 JURIMETRICS J. 387 (2003). 
 83. See Herring, supra note 81, at 363. 
 84. See Herring, supra note 82. 
 85. See David J. Herring, Foster Care Placement:  Reducing the Risk of Sibling Incest, 
37 MICH. J. L. REFORM 1145 (2004). 
 86. See Herring, supra note 81. 
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familiarity with a particular area of scientific research that is relevant to 
law and policy.  This first step itself is not new.87  It requires the legal 
scholar to engage research literature from a scientific discipline.  It also 
involves the legal scholar in an examination of the possible relevance of 
specific research findings to particular areas of law and policy.  
However, this first step does not involve the legal scholar in the process 
of scientific research.  That is the subject of the second step, the step that 
makes this approach to legal scholarship new. 
It is important to note at the outset that the second step in this 
approach stands apart from Professor Ulen’s (and others’) call for legal 
scholars to engage in empirical research.88  Ulen urges legal scholars to 
conduct empirical research concerning the operation of the law.89  His 
examples present the legal scholar as a self-directed, independent 
empirical researcher.90  This scholar may work with others (e.g. 
economists, statisticians), but she designs and conducts the empirical 
studies.  Ulen’s is the ambitious vision of law as science and the legal 
scholar as social scientist. 
In contrast, the second step in my proposed approach calls for the 
legal scholar to become a member of a scientific research team.  For 
example, in conducting my work on the kinship cue of attitude similarity 
I had an occasion to e-mail Justin Park, the lead researcher in one 
important study.91  I asked him for the complete list of attitudes they had 
included in their research instrument.  He responded not only with the 
list, but with a welcoming message.  He was pleased to learn that 
someone is exploring the practical implications of their research.  He 
asked for my article on facial resemblance and opened the door to 
further discussion.92  We have since shared several draft papers and 
engaged in discussions of kinship cue research. 
By engaging a scientific researcher in this type of substantive 
 
 87. See, e.g., Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law, supra note 2; Jones, supra note 12; 
Lu-in Wang, The Transforming Power of “Hate”:  Social Cognition Theory and the Harms of 
Bias-Related Crime, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 47 (1997) (using social cognition research to analyze 
hate crimes). 
 88. See Ulen, supra note 28, at 418-23; Schneider & Teitelbaum, supra note 42; 
Michael Heise, The Past, Present and Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship:  Judicial 
Decision Making and the New Empiricism, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 819; Frank Cross, Michael 
Heise & Gregory C. Sisk, Above the Rules:  A Response to Epstein and King, 69 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 135 (2002); Shari Seidman Diamond, Empirical Marine Life in Legal Waters:  Clams, 
Dolphins, and Plankton, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 803. 
 89. See Ulen, supra note 28, at 418-23. 
 90. Id. at 415-23. 
 91. See Herring, supra note 81, at 375 n.112. 
 92. See e-mail from Justin H. Park (Sept. 6, 2005) (on file with author). 
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discussion, a legal scholar may eventually be invited to join a research 
team.  As a member of the research team, the legal scholar may be able 
to make substantial contributions such as the identification of 
appropriate contexts for studies and experiments.93  In my case, I could 
stress the potential of foster care systems to provide a natural setting for 
testing hypotheses addressing the likely impact of various kinship cues 
on biologically unrelated individuals.  Because foster care requires 
adults to provide care for unrelated children, the research team may be 
able to use this setting to explore how various kinship cues affect the 
treatment of foster children. 
More commonly, the legal scholar may be able to raise interesting 
and fruitful research inquiries.94  For example, in my work using kinship 
cues I have regularly referenced the federal Multiethnic Placement Act 
(“MEPA”).95  This law prohibits public child welfare agencies from 
systematically using race as a factor in deciding whether to place a child 
in a particular foster home.96  The law is controversial.  It fuels intense 
public debate concerning basic social values surrounding race.  Namely, 
it pits a public goal of a color-blind society against the possible social 
 
 93. To illustrate this possible contribution, consider that I met legal scholar John Lanou 
at an April, 2006 conference sponsored by the Society for Evolutionary Analysis in Law.  He 
has engaged in research with behavioral biologist Debra Lieberman of the University of 
Hawaii.  Together, they have hypothesized that judges who grew up in close proximity to an 
opposite sex sibling would find incest especially repugnant and impose harsher sentences in 
incest cases than judges who did not have this type of experience with a sibling.  They are 
attempting to test this hypothesis which is based on the kinship cue of proximity during 
childhood.  John Lanou, as a legal scholar, was able to recognize this possible impact on 
criminal sentencing and to assist in designing a study to test the hypothesis in an appropriate 
context. 
 94. To illustrate this possible contribution, consider Owen Jones’ recent collaboration 
with primatologist Sarah Brosnan, investigating the endowment effect from an evolutionary 
perspective.  The endowment effect is evident when individuals immediately value an item 
they have just come to own at a higher dollar amount than the maximum amount they would 
have paid to acquire the item an instant ago.  The phenomenon has implications for law, 
because it can impede efficient trading of goods and services in the marketplace.  And Jones, 
as well as Jones and Goldsmith, had argued that the phenomenon may reflect the effects of 
evolutionary processes on human predispositions, possibly resulting in patterns only 
recognizable and predictable in light of evolutionary analysis.  See Jones, Law’s Leverage, 
supra note 2, at 1154-55, 1183-85; Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 452-54.  Jones has 
consequently partnered with a primatologist to begin testing specific hypotheses in 
chimpanzees which may indicate a long evolutionary history to the phenomenon in both 
humans and other primates. 
 95. Pub. L. No. 103-382 § 551.108 Stat. 4056 (1994) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1996b (2000) and 42 U.S.C. § 5115a (1994) (repealed 1996)).  See Herring, supra note 81; 
Herring, supra note 82. 
 96. See 42 U.S.C. § 1996b (2000). 
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benefits of maintaining children within their racial communities, being 
raised by adults who can fully appreciate and educate them about their 
racial identity.97 
To date, the debate has not addressed MEPA’s impact on child 
safety to any significant degree.  However, if race is a characteristic that 
is likely to affect an adult’s perception of a child as kin, a prohibition on 
race matching may have negative consequences for child safety in foster 
care.  In other words, a practice of matching a foster child’s race with 
that of his foster parent may help achieve a public goal of child safety.98 
In addressing this issue, it would be useful to know about the 
relationship between race and kinship cues (or superficial similarities99) 
that evoke favorable treatment.  Therefore, this inquiry identifies 
possible avenues for useful behavioral biology research.  For example, 
researchers could test the hypothesis that a child who shares facial 
features including race with an unrelated adult evokes more favorable 
treatment than a child who shares facial features but not race.  
Researchers could test this hypothesis through photo morphing 
experiments in the laboratory.  They could also attempt to test this 
hypothesis in the foster care setting. 
In relation to the latter possibility, the legal scholar could make 
additional substantial contributions to the research team.  She could help 
the research team identify and measure forms of favorable treatment 
within foster care settings.  She could also assist the team in gaining 
access to necessary data from foster care systems.  As a legal 
professional, she would likely have a degree of credibility with judges 
and agency officials that would facilitate access to detailed information. 
Once the research team completes its test of the hypothesis, the 
legal scholar would work with team members to communicate the results 
 
 97. See ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY’S CHILDREN:  ABUSE AND NEGLECT, 
FOSTER DRIFT, AND THE ADOPTION ALTERNATIVE (1999); RANDALL KENNEDY, 
INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES:  SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND ADOPTION (2003); Twila L. 
Perry, The Transracial Adoption Controversy:  An Analysis of Discourse and Subordination, 
21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 33 (1993-94); Ruth-Arlene W. Howe, Transracial 
Adoption (TRA):  Old Prejudices and Discrimination Float Under a New Halo, 6 B.U. PUB. 
INT. L.J. 409 (1997). 
 98. See Herring, supra note 81; Herring, supra note 82. 
 99. In my discussions with behavioral biologist Debra Lieberman I have come to realize 
that race is unlikely to be an actual kinship cue.  Distinctive racial features developed too late 
in human evolutionary history to operate as a cue for kinship.  However, race may operate as a 
superficial similarity signal that evokes favorable treatment from others much as a kinship cue 
would.  See Jerry M. Burger, Nicole Messian, Shebani Patel, Alicia del Prado & Carmen 
Anderson, What a Coincidence!  The Effects of Incidental Similarity on Compliance, 30 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 35 (2004). 
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to legal decisionmakers and public policymakers.  This new information 
would not dictate any particular legal or policy outcomes, but it might be 
worthy of consideration.  For example, if researchers find that race 
matching would likely enhance child safety to some degree, public 
officials may want to use this information to pursue a color-blind foster 
care system with care and sophistication.100 
The legal scholar’s goal is not only to learn from scientific 
researchers or to engage them in discussions of law and policy, but also 
to form partnerships with scientific researchers – to actually join the 
research team.  This goal presents a substantial challenge to a legal 
scholar inclined to pursue this approach.  It requires the scholar to reach 
outside her area of expertise and comfort in order to build working 
relationships with researchers in fields other than law. 
Pursuing full participation in scientific research provides part of the 
answer to the question of what is next for law and behavioral biology.  
As a member of a behavioral biology research team, the legal scholar 
can actively participate in the creation and dissemination of new 
knowledge that serves some of the important functions identified by 
Owen Jones and Timothy Goldsmith in their Columbia Law Review 
article.101  For example, new knowledge could contribute substantially to 
a fuller awareness of conflicts among various social and public policy 
goals.102  It could also provide a fuller identification and understanding 
of the costs and benefits related to current or proposed laws and 
policies.103  And as Owen Jones and I have discussed, knowledge 
produced by behavioral biology research could serve to fortify current 
 
 100. As a member of a research team examining kinship cues the legal scholar could 
raise many other questions related to foster care.  For example, does the practice of placing 
foster children with biologically related adults enhance safety?  Does the magnitude of the 
safety effect vary by degree of relatedness, with more distantly related kin providing little or 
no increase in safety compared to unrelated foster parents?  Does an agency practice of 
including close family friends or neighbors as kin yield safety benefits?  As an example of 
another line of possible inquiry, researchers may want to examine the relevance of kinship 
cues in pursuing the dominant public goal of achieving timely, stable permanent placements 
for foster children.  Namely, would the consideration of kinship cues in the placement process 
possibly result in more and/or quicker adoption outcomes for foster children with their foster 
parents?  Also, does the consideration of kinship cues in making adoption placements result in 
more stability and a reduced likelihood of adoption disruption in the future?  By participating 
as a member of a scientific research team, the legal scholar could raise these types of 
questions and identify appropriate contexts for scientific research. 
 101. See Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 2. 
 102. Id. at 435-36. 
 103. Id. at 436. 
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legal and policy approaches.104 
In conclusion, my proposed approach to legal scholarship does not 
conceive of law as a science.  It also does not place the legal scholar in 
the role of a scientist or empiricist.  Instead, the legal scholar plays a 
more modest role – as a participating member of a scientific research 
team.  In this role, the legal scholar contributes to a research endeavor 
that employs the scientific method to produce new knowledge mostly in 
small, incremental steps.  She strives for nothing more than to participate 
in the production of new knowledge and the effective communication of 
that knowledge to other legal scholars, legal decisionmakers, and 
policymakers.  It is a role that both requires humility and promises 
significant advances in knowledge relevant to law and policy. 
 
 
 104. For an example of this function, consider my article addressing sibling incest.  
Herring, supra note 81.  Behavioral biology research indicates that opposite sex siblings who 
live together during the first four to six years of life develop a sexual aversion to each other.  
Separation of opposite sex siblings during this period increases the risk of subsequent sibling 
incest.  I use this research to assert the importance of placing young opposite sex siblings 
together in the same foster home if foster care is required.  This assertion fortifies and 
strengthens the existing policy to place siblings together.  See id. 
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